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Trajectories of State Building and Peace Building in Ethiopia:  
The Role of Political Settlement,   
Introduction 
This baseline introduces a research agenda that aims to assess the effect of political 
settlement on the subsequent trajectories of peace building and state reconstitution in 
Ethiopia. To this end, it aims to trace the trajectories of state building conversations, 
analyze the causes of armed conflict, examine the nature of the political transition, and 
assess the effects of the post-1991 political order on the causes of armed conflict in the 
country. The questions it poses are: what was the nature of state building conversations 
before the outbreak of war and what were the causes of the conflict in the country? How 
did the settlement come about and what were its distinct features? Has the settlement 
addressed the causes of the conflict? Has identity issues that were part of the conflict been 
given due considerations 
The baseline is structured into seven parts. The first part introduces the objectives and 
guiding questions of the baseline followed by a discussion of the historical trajectories of 
state building conversations that led to the armed conflict in the second part. The causes, 
ideologies, organizational structures and mobilization strategies of the Tigray People 
Liberation Front (TPLF) are presented in the subsequent two sections. The fifth section is 
an exposition of the process leading to, and the nature of, the political settlement achieved 
with the victory of the TPLF. After assessing the extent the settlement addressed the major 
causes of the conflict in the sixth part, the paper identifies lessons to be learned and 
propositions to be drawn from the baseline report in the final section. Generally, what 
emerges from the report is that while the post-1991 political actors and processes might be 
the result of contradictions inherent in the historical process of state building 




State Formation, Consolidation and Civil War 
Being heir to an ancient state, Ethiopia has a long and uninterrupted political history with 
its own unique literary system, nationalist ideology, and social organization. Its territory 
had been expanding and contracting throughout its long history of statehood. And it is the 
sole African state that was able to defeat European colonialists and retain its independence 
during the 19th century scramble for Africa. Its independent political survival was ensured 
through the imposition of imperial power over peoples to the South and West of historic 
Ethiopia which resulted in a deeply unequal political structure in which power was derived 
from the Christians of the historic state (especially Amharas, but also Tigrayans and 
others). 
Because of these historical trajectories the formation of the modern Ethiopian state was 
unique from the rest of Africa. The builders of modern Ethiopia inherited a centralized, 
highly extractive state that presided over a sufficiently integrated society akin to the 
modern nation-state. Though the existence of a long tradition of statehood enabled the 
successive rulers to further entrench their apparatus of control, it also generated it own 
contradictions that had affected the subsequent process of state making and remaking. The 
emergence of the modern Ethiopian state at the end of the 19th century under the 
successive emperors was accomplished through the expansion of the Abyssinian Christian 
kingdom. The process was started by Emperor Tewdros II Gondar and Yohannes IV of 
Tigray and was accomplished by Menilik II of Shoa during which the country acquired its 
present shape. The process of incorporation doubled the size of the Abyssinian polity as it 
conquered dozens of ethnic groups. Consequently, the Ethiopian society became highly 
heterogeneous society unlike the Abyssinian proper that had an integrated society 
adhering to similar social organizations and normative orders. The process of conquest and 
state formation also involved the superimposition of the socio-economic order of the 
Northern society on the newly incorporated people the result of which was ‘a politically 
explosive conjunction of ethnic and class divisions’ (Markakis, 1989:119). And while most 
African colonial territories had at least a brief period of democratic politics during the run-
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up to independence in the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia remained until 1974 under the 
anachronistic rule of emperor Haile Selassie. 
Emperor Haile Selassie launched the process of modernization, bureaucratization and 
consolidation of the military without essentially changing the centralized and ethnocratic 
nature of the state. As part of the emperor’s modernization drive, modern education was 
introduced, government and mission schools were opened, and a handful of students, 
usually from a poor background, were sent abroad for education. These early educated 
students began to fill the state bureaucracy and enthusiastically advocated reform of the 
imperial order to realize the emperor`s modernizing ambition. Their reformist orientation 
served as a precursor to the more radical student movements of the 1960 and 70s. The 
power of the traditional class began to be supplanted by this emerging powerful class of 
educated state bureaucrats and students. The establishment and subsequent consolidation 
of a powerful army further strengthened the power of the monarchy vis-à-vis the nobility 
who used to be the source of military power. However, the cost of maintaining these 
civilian and military bureaucracies was too prohibitive for the peasantry from which 
resources were extracted to pay for the servants of the state. The regime introduced a 
series of reforms in the tax system applied over land to increase the state`s revenue. A 
uniform taxation system to be paid in the new currency was issued in 1939 which also 
abolished provision of labor services, firewood and grasses for landlords by 
gabbars/Tributaries (Markakis, 2011).  While a new taxation system introduced taxation in 
lieu of tithe and land tax in 1944, education tax and health tax on land were introduced in 
1947 and 1959 respectively (ibid.). However, all of these measures failed to increase the 
amount of revenue the regime collected from agriculture in general and land in particular. 
During its reign, the emperor`s effort was restricted to increasing the extractive capacity of 
the state rather than advancing the overall development of the people and that any effort at 
improving the tax system that shifts the burden from the peasantry to the landlords was 
fiercely resisted by the parliament dominated by the latter (Keller, 1981). The pace of 
economic growth was not on par with the modest increase in education and hence finding 
employment after graduation began to be hard in the later period of the emperor. 
4 
 
These bureaucratization and modernization initiatives ushered in social contradictions that 
were overlaid on the existing ones. These contradictions include the center-periphery 
disjuncture, the contradictory vision of the aristocracy and the petit bourgeoisie, and 
discontents related to ethno-cultural suppression and religious domination. Andargachew 
(1993) demonstrated how these contradictions played out in the 1960s to weaken the 
Haile Selassie regime, and precipitate its eventual collapse.  
First, the new state bureaucrats, both civilian and military, that had replaced the traditional 
aristocracy were not satisfied with the working of the imperial order. This section of the 
society together with white collar works, teachers and students avowedly advocated 
Marxisim-Leninism as a solution to Ethiopia`s woe. They attributed the backwardness and 
impoverishment of the Ethiopian people to the anachronistic imperial regime and agitated 
to dismantle it. The 1960 failed coup d’état was one manifestation of this discontent. 
Though a failed attempt, the coup further increased the discontent against the regime by 
challenging the sacred foundation of the emperor`s power. The army that quelled the coup 
began to demand a salary increase and improvement in the conditions of their life 
cognizant of the key role it was playing to maintain the imperial order. As the modern 
sector and the nascent industries expanded civil servants and industrial works began to be 
politically organized forming their own labor union, teachers association and student 
unions.  
The regimes failure to address the prevailing contradiction combined with the alienating 
nature of the educational system further radicalized the student body (Messay, 2003).  
Their initial demand for improvements of conditions in the campus was transformed into a 
call for fundamental reconstitution of the Ethiopian state. Two issues were given greater 
emphasis in the student body: the question of nationalities and the class contradiction. The 
emphasis on these issues was determined by the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the students 
and the prevalent social conditions of the country. The prevalence of widespread tenancy 
in the south generated a call for land reform that entitles land to the peasants. In a radical 
turn the students argued that Ethiopia was not a united multi-ethnic nation but a ‘prison 
house of nations and nationalities’. The emperor`s defunct policy of unmediated 
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assimilation in which the culture and language of the ruling class is forcefully imposed on 
the subordinated nationalities brought this radical stance. In line with these Marxist-
Leninist ideology, they argued for the rights of nations and nationalities for self-
determination including and up to secession. Their demand was not just to improve the 
conditions of the various nationalities constituting Ethiopia, but a radical restructuring of 
the Ethiopia state. Recognizing the determination of the imperial regime to silence the 
students’ political demand, dedicated members of the student body fled abroad to plan 
guerilla war against the imperial order.   
Second, the emperor`s centralization of power and the consequent process of ‘shoanization 
of the state’ marginalized the peripheries. This marginalization generated violent 
resistance even in areas that constituted the heart of the historic Ethiopian state. Some of 
the groups in the periphery, notably, the Oromos of Bale, the Eritreans and the Somali`s of 
Ogaden had already started armed struggle against the regime. These groups were armed 
by neighboring states and the states of the Middle East for ideological and strategic reasons 
of their own (Adargachew, 1993).  
Amidst of these contradictions and radicalization, the final challenge for the imperial order 
came from discontents at the center triggered by the emperor`s negligence of the 1973/74 
famine in Wollo. Throughout January to June 1974 various groups began to wage strikes 
and demonstrations demanding salary increase, improvement in working conditions, right 
to form trade unions and related demands. The main actors of this popular uprising were 
teachers, students, civil servants, trade unions and the armed force. The final push against 
the regime came from the army. Soldiers below the rank of major established a 
committee/council known in Amharic as Derg to present their demand to the emperor. It is 
this committee known as the Derg that deposed the emperor and seized power. The Derg 
renamed itself the Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC) and adopted the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology of the civilian left in its bid to legitimatize its power (Messay, 
2008). Accordingly, it nationalized financial institutions, large scale manufacturing firms, 
and land. The Derg’s answer to Ethiopia’s age-old problems was socialist centralization.       
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The possession of land was restricted to a maximum of ten hectare and the sale or rent of it 
was prohibited. Peasant associations were established to distribute land among the 
peasantry. This initiative got wider popularity in the south where the majority of the 
peasants were reduced to tenancy. However, this euphoria soon dissipated in the face of 
deeply unpopular measures the Derg undertook in its agricultural policy. The peasant 
associations, which were initially established to distribute land for the peasantry, were 
eventually captured by the regime to serve the political functions of “collecting taxes, 
maintaining law and order, channeling directives to the peasantry, enforcing the 
government's grain requisition programmes … and later recruiting young men for the 
military ” (Desalegn, 1993:39). Other policy measures such as collectivization, grain 
requisitioning, resettlement, and villagisation were not only unpopular but also proved 
failure. According to Desalegn (1993), these programmes were implemented without even 
a semblance of discussion with the peasant population. They were distained to fail due to 
shortage of trained human power, and the ambitious nature of the programmes. To make 
way for the implementation of these policies, extension agents evicted a number of farmers 
from their original land.  Under the grain requisition scheme peasants were required to sell 
a certain quota of their produce to the agricultural marketing Corporation at a price 
cheaper than the market price. The agents of the Agricultural marketing board (AMC) set 
an arbitrarily quotas to the determent of the interests of the peasant in the process of 
implementing this policy (ibid.). The resettlement programme, which was implemented 
hastily, coercively and with little planning, also proved a failure (Baker, 1990).  The Derg 
also dismantled or co-opted organizations that could potentially challenge the regime`s 
grip on power.  
The Derg instituted a strong but exclusionary state to the end of which the aforementioned 
policy measures and institutions were employed. The Kebele administration and peasant 
associations were transformed from instruments of local self-governance to instruments of 
central control and resource extraction. Though the chairmen of these institutions were 
nominally elected, they were almost always appointed by higher level party officials. The 
party apparatus infiltrated these institutions and mass organizations with the goal of 
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controlling every sphere of social life. To this end, the Derg increased the number of 
military and civilian bureaucracy. In the economic sphere, though its socialist policies failed 
to improve the economy of the country, the Derg increased its extractive capacity and the 
amount of resources it extracted from the largely peasant population (Clapham, 1989). 
Thus, the Derg had created a strong state in terms of its capacity for control, extraction and 
mobilization (ibid.). The regime`s Achilles heel, however, was its exclusion of the various 
groups or claimants for power. It was ready neither to accommodate the centrist forces 
that had played an active role in the overthrow of the imperial order nor the ethno-
nationalists demanding greater autonomy. The Derg`s usual response for the problems 
posed by these force was the unbridled use of force to subdue any actual and potential 
challenge to its power. Most of these forces were the outgrowth of the Ethiopian Student 
Movement and that the leadership of the organizations formed by these groups was 
dominated by individuals that had actively engaged in the student movement. To better 
understand the causes and dynamics of insurgencies in the country, a brief digression on 
the student movement is in order.  
Two major categories of political groups emerged from the student movement during the 
overthrow of the imperial regime. One category consisted of those groups that were 
organized on multinational basis convinced that the primary contradiction of the period 
was class rather than ethnicity and hence the response needs to be a nationwide class 
struggle. The two major groups in this camp were the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement 
(MEISON in Amharic) and the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party (EPRP). In the wake of 
the revolution, while the former decided to give critical support for the Derg, the latter 
called for the immediate establishment of provisional People`s government. Though, 
difference between the two groups had deeper root beyond their approach to the Derg, it 
became open only when they revealed their orientation towards the Derg. The most 
important difference between the two was centered on the party that would be a vanguard 
party in the country (Andargachew, 1993). Realizing EPRP`s popular support base and the 
difficulty of outbidding it, the AESM claimed that there were radical elements within the 
Derg that could be directed to pursue socialist policies. It also argued that military rule is 
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the only realistic option for Ethiopia by then and hence the need to give critical support for 
the Derg. The EPRP opposed military rule on the ground that it was against genuine social 
revolution and that socialist revolution cannot be brought in a top down manner. The 
Derg`s escalation of the war in Eritrea, the banning of voluntary associations and attack on 
trade unions, and the Derg`s reluctance to acknowledge class struggle were considered as 
indicative of the Derg`s counter revolutionary nature. The EPRP launched urban guerilla 
against the Derg selectively targeting individuals that provided key support for the Derg. 
The PMAC swiftly responded by indiscriminately killing individuals and groups, mainly the 
youth, presumed to be either member or sympathizers of the EPRP. Later the Derg turned 
its wrath against the AESM when it realized that the latter`s intention was no more 
sanguine than the EPRP. 
With the total annihilation of the major multinational forces, the only resistance against the 
regime remained to be the ethnic based movements. These ethnic based movements 
prioritizing national contradiction over the class one, called for the resolution of national 
contradictions before multinational class struggle was to be undertaken. These movements 
originated from those ethnic groups that felt to be a victim of Shoan political domination, 
economic expropriation and/or marginalization, and cultural discrimination (Shahim, 
1985). A number of ethno-nationalist forces such as the Tigray People Liberation Front, the 
Oromo Liberation Front and the Afar Liberation Front were all organized along ethno-
nationalist lines. These political groupings opted to wage guerilla struggle from their 
remote ethnic base. The Derg`s stance towards these movements was not accommodative 
either. Resolving these conflicts through negotiation was against the survival of the military 
regime. One of the raison d`etre for the continuation of the PMAC was its self-declared 
mission of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state. Hence the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict with these ethno-nationalist forces was against this raison d`etre. 
The way the Derg viewed the national contradiction was also not in line with the demands 
of the ethno-nationalists. The Derg reduced the national contradiction to the mere 
accommodation of cultural rights thereby ignoring the fact that it had strong political 
undercurrents. However, these groups were not fighting only to secure the right to equal 
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recognition of their culture; it also included demand for regional autonomy if not outright 
secession. The Derg believed that national oppression was ended when the imperial state is 
dismantled and hence the ethno-nationalists were relegated as narrow nationalist and 
secessionist that are against Ethiopian unity. It offered them little compromise as the motto 
was ‘Ethiopia or death’. Hence, the national contradiction that had been unfolding since the 
formation of the modern Ethiopian state was further radicalized and that military solution 
became the only option as a result of which the armed conflict continued until the 
overthrow of the military regime in 1991. 
 The genesis of a good part of the post-1974 opposition groups goes back to the Ethiopian 
Student Movement/ESM/ of the late 1960s and early 1970s.In their attempt to integrate 
the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the Ethiopian situation Ethiopian students 
touched the most sensitive issue; the question of nationalities.  As was feared the issue of 
nationalities turned out to be the most controversial political issue and threatened the 
unity of the students. So in the late 1960s and early 1970s less as well as more serious 
advocates of the question of nationalities emerged from the last hours of the Ethiopian 
Student Movement. This, among others, was the main factor behind the progressive 
polarization of the Student Movement and later the violent conflict among anti-Derg 
opposition groups in Tigray particularly the war between the TPLF and several insurgent 
groups in the North of the country. 
To further illuminate the causes and dynamics of insurgencies in Ethiopia an examination 
of the insurgent force-turned-government is undertaken in the next section. An assessment 
of the causes, dynamics, ideologies and mobilization strategies of the TPLF insurgency and 
the subsequent process leading to military victory and state restructuring is undertaken in 
the next three sections. 
Insurgency in Tigray and the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) 
The origin of the Tigray People Liberation Front is explained in terms of historical 
grievances and symbolism, conditions in Tigray during the period of emperor Haile 
Selassie, and the Derg`s approach to the manifold problems of the region. An extensive 
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discussion of these issues is provided by Medhane (1992), Young (1996) and Aregawi 
(2008). Hence, the following discussion largely draws from these works.  
Historically, Tigray was at the core of the Ethiopian empire. One of the world`s most 
powerful civilization, the Axumites, were based in Tigray. This perception of being at the 
core of the Ethiopian empire had generated a sense of deprivation when the Tigryan elite 
compared their past glory with their status of political obscurity, and widespread famine 
and poverty. Moreover, Tigray had been the gateway for foreign incursion and hence 
numerous battles between the Ethiopians and foreigners were waged on Tigray`s soil. This 
had not only devastated the region but also eased the availability of firearms as a result of 
which struggle among local lords became too destructive. The peasants were forced to side 
with one or the other lord compromising their devotion on their farm. Famine was not an 
infrequent occurrence in this part of Ethiopia. By one reckoning at least seventeen famines 
had been observed in Tigray since the last decade of the 19th century (Young, 1996).  
Tigray`s marginalization continued during the period of Emperor Haile Selassie. Young 
(1996) indicated that before the outbreak of the 1974 revolution, Tigray possessed almost 
no industry, no commercial agriculture, no mines, and only few secondary schools. Most of 
the existing industries were concentrated around Addis Ababa and Asmara, and the 
commercial farms were concentrated in the south and the Awash valley. The Tigrayans had 
to move to relatively better areas such as Addis Ababa and Asmara in search of work. This 
gave them derogatory names that wounded their pride of being the center of the Ethiopian 
empire. This period of Tigray`s marginalization was also accompanied with the political 
and economic dominance of Shoan rulers. In his bid to centralize power, Emperor Haile 
Selassie imposed Amharic as the national language, banned Tigragna from court, school, 
and administrative use, and replaced most of the local lords of Tigray by his own nominees 
of Shoan origin.  Tigray`s petit bourgeoisie felt marginalized in terms of access to education 
and employment opportunities. They compared their situation with the number of schools 
opened during the period of Italian occupation and the preference given to Shoan Amhara. 
These cultural suppression, political domination and economic marginalization were 
beginning to stir nationalist sentiments among teachers of Tigray origin.  Schools in Tigray 
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became center of resistance and dissidence in which discontents were expressed through 
protests and strikes. Their demand at the time was expansion of projects such as roads, 
electricity, schools, health facilities and industries. These emerging elites associated the 
problems in Tigray with the dominance of the Shoan Amhara. The Tigrayan elites` 
grievance against the Shaon emperors was centered on the latter`s neglect of the region. 
They felt that the Shoan emperors do not care about the condition in Tigray except their 
power. Many Tigray elites believed that the neglect and marginalization of Tigray was a 
systematic and deliberate action by the Amhara to demonize and demoralize the Tigrayan. 
While such problems were brewing in Tigray, a parallel process of resistance against the 
imperial order was taking place in the Ethiopian student movement. The student body 
adopted Marxism-Leninism and the associated notion of national self-determination for the 
nations and nationalities of Ethiopia. Ethiopia was depicted as a backward empire that was 
a prison house of nations and nationalities. Tigryan students were an active participant of 
the student body during which they used the opportunity afforded by University life to 
raise regional and national issues of concern. Issues raised include ‘[l]and degradation, 
recurring famine, mass unemployment, political marginalization, cultural domination and 
different social problems’ (Aregaw, 2008:59). The students compared the situation in 
Tigray with the situation in other parts of Ethiopia which they founded it worse in Tigray. 
This increased their grievance especially when it is seen in light of the historic role of 
Tigray as the core of the Ethiopian Empire. In 1972, Tigrayan students established the 
Tigray University Students Union (TUSU). The Union was to promote Tigrayan culture and 
historical pride, to identify the problems of Tigray and to deal with issues such as the 
formation of a Tigray Nationalist Organisation/TNO/ and later the Tigray Nation 
Progressive Union/TNPU/. With the demise of the Haileselasie regime in September 1974, 
the TNPU was already recruiting members to leave for rural Tigray in order to start the 
armed struggle against the Derg. Tigrayan students were already pointedly determined to 
create their own political organisation and decided on a Tigrayan nationalist movement 
separate from multinationally-oriented formations. The uncertainty generated by the 
overthrow of the emperor and the coming to power of the Derg triggered the formation of 
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many armed movements among which one was the Tigrayan National Organization which 
was later transformed into Tigray People Liberation Front. The TNO started its task of 
mobilizing the people of Tigray in earnest to embark an armed struggle from rural part of 
the country. The TPLF formally announced its formation in 1975. The timing of the 
transformation of the TNO into an insurgent force is presumed to have been affected by 
factors related to the weakening of the regime, the danger of being pre-empted by other 
organizations, the Derg`s red terror campaign (Young, 1996). 
Ideology, Organization and Mobilization 
The ideology of the TPLF as an offshoot of the Ethiopian Student Movement was rooted in 
Marxism-Leninism. Three central issues informed its ideology, mobilization strategies and 
operational modalities: the national question, democratic centralism and revolutionary 
democracy. The national question was introduced to the discourse on Ethiopian politics 
during the 1960s by the Ethiopian Student Movement. As noted earlier, the students 
argued that Ethiopia was a prison house of nations and nationalities and that these nations 
and nationalities should be granted the right to self-determination including and up to 
secession. The TPLF also subscribed to this ideological current and claimed that the 
Tigrayan nation should be granted the right to self-determination. Although the TPLF 
advocated independence as the only way of self-determination in manifesto-68, it later 
modified its position that it would be satisfied by political and cultural autonomy within a 
multi-ethnic Ethiopia (Aalan, 2002). Affirming the idea that secession was not the only 
option, the TPLF stated that ‘[b]eing part of a democratic multi-ethnic Ethiopia based on 
equality, where there are no oppressor and oppressed nations; where the rights of every 
nations without distinction is constitutionally and in practice safeguarded, where 
democracy and social justice prevail, and where the fundamental human rights of the 
peoples are not violated, is also acceptable to the people of Tigray’ (quoted in Vaughan, 
1994:9).  
The other guiding ideology embedded in its Leninist orientation was democratic 
centralism. The party considered itself a vanguard party that represents and liberates the 
people of Tigray. According to this Leninist principle, once the top leadership makes 
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democratic decisions the lower level cadres need to implement it without any form of 
question. In this model idea always flows downward from the Central committee to the 
lower level structures (Aregawi, 2008). Aregawi (2008) recounted the power monopolized 
by the Central Committee stating that the central committee can make any type of decisions 
concerning the life of the masses. At the core of this ideology was the Marxisit-Lenninist 
League of Tigray, a highly secretive party within a party, which aims to ideologically guide 
the TPLF struggle to the achievement of socialism (Tronvol and Vaughan, 2003). Aregawi 
indicated that those members of the MLLT that showed even slight deviation from the 
party`s line were considered class enemies, and those comrades that posed even tough 
questions were accused of revisionism. Likewise, those who failed to comply were accused 
of empiricism or opportunism.   
The third ideological pillar of the TPLF was revolutionary democracy which was derived 
from the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The percept of revolutionary democracy, as formulated 
by the TPLF, is that after some leveling measures the peasantry would constitute a 
homogenous mass with similar interests and political orientations (Tronvoll and Vaughan, 
2003). Under such circumstance, pluralism and its institutional underpinnings are 
irrelevant except for arriving at consensus. Decisions are made based on consensus to the 
end of which concerted effort would be exerted. Aregawi (2008) contented that the 
centralizing, hierarchical and order obedient nature of the organization had exceeded its 
participatory and democratic aspects like all other Marxist-Leninist forces.  
In line with its ideological orientations and with the goal of militarily overthrowing the 
Derg, the TPLF employed a range of mobilization techniques and a tightly hierarchical 
organizational structure. Organizationally, at the top of the organizational ladder was the 
fighters’ congress that elects the executive committee. The Executive committees in turn 
developed the organizational structure necessary to execute the armed struggle. The TPLF 
had three major committees that comprised members of the central committee: military 
committee, political, and socio-economic committees. These committees were structured to 
institute a vanguard party that aimed to control and transform the society from above. The 
TPLF used this organizational structure to effectively execute mobilization strategies 
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required for the war effort. The organizational structure enabled the TPLF to reach deep 
into the smallest unit of social existence and enabled it to overthrow the military regime 
and restructure the Ethiopian state accordingly. The various sections of the society of 
Tigray were organized to have their own mass organization which operates under the 
oversight of the TPLF in one way or the other. Operating from isolated areas in the largely 
marginalized northern territory of Tigray, the student-led TPLF was avowedly Marxist and 
committed to Maoist like notions of protracted people’s war based on the peasants. It must 
be stressed that unlike most African governing groups the TPLF, profoundly ideological of a 
Stalinist variant, came to power by a lengthy armed struggle, on the basis of peasant 
support, and committed to a revolutionary transformation of society. Notwithstanding this 
fact, the specific political character of the TPLF heavily impacted on its relations with other 
political/armed groups. 
The people of Tigray were mobilized to associate their deprivation with Amhara 
dominance and to think that the removal of Amhara dominated government would 
alleviate their suffering. Moreover, mobilization was accompanied by promising a bright 
future in which the manifold problems of Tigray would be alleviated. These promises were 
rendered credible by opening clinics and schools in remote villages during the period of 
insurgency. Moreover, the TPLF avoided lawlessness and eliminated banditry that was 
rampant in the region. All these indicate the level of organizational effectiveness of the 
TPLF. It not only waged guerilla and conventional war against the Derg but also undertook 
development initiatives to secure the support of the peasant population.   
Path to power and Paradigm shift in State Building 
Since the mid-1980s the military balance began to shift towards rebels operating in the 
Northern part of the country. Bedeviled by numerous crises including an impending loss of 
global ally, the military regime was forced to entertain defeat. Consequently, the Derg 
opened itself for negotiation with the rebels and a number of negotiations that were 
facilitated by external powers were attempted. One of the negotiation efforts in this regard 
was the 1989 negotiation attempt between the Derg and the Eritrean People Liberation 
Front. The main negotiator, Carter, was later replaced by Herman Cohen and the 
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negotiation was extended to the TPLF because of the latter`s success in controlling the 
whole of Tigray and beyond. However, none of these efforts bore fruit as they were not 
entered into with a good faith. Parallel to these negotiation efforts with the Derg, the TPLF 
was forging alliance with existing movements and organizing new ones. The TPLF forged 
alliance only with forces that would not fundamentally jeopardize its strategic and 
ideological goal of remaining a hegemonic actor in the politics of the country. Consequently, 
the alliance was essentially achieved through the replication of the ideology, organizational 
structure, and operational modalities of the TPLF (Aregawi, 2008).   
The TPLF facilitated the formation of the Ethiopian People Democratic Movement (EPDM) 
by providing it all the necessary material, political and diplomatic supports (Aregawi, 
2008). The EPDM, in return, promoted the propaganda and ideology of the TPLF, and 
copied the organizational structure and operational modalities of the former. It established 
its own Ethiopian People Marxist-Leninists Force that aimed to achieve objectives similar 
to the Marxisit-Leninist League of Tigray. The two fronts formed the Ethiopian people 
revolutionary democratic front, the EPDM being a junior partner and being largely 
dependent on the TPLF to administer occupied territories. In 1990 the EPRDF widened its 
coalition by organizing the Oromo People (OPDO) Democratic Organization from the 
prisoners of war. Thus, with the nominal participation of the EPDM (later transformed into 
the Amhara National Democratic Movement), and OPDO the TPLF triumphantly concluded 
the war with the Derg in may 28, 1991.  
Before the EPRDF/TPLF controlled Addis Ababa a conference was held in London in 1991 
that participated the government`s representatives and various nationalist forces. The 
government`s negotiator withdrew from the process as the government was losing power. 
The liberation forces that participated in the conference were the EPRDF, EPLF and the 
OLF. The OLF was invited though it did not take part in the discussion over substantive 
issues. With the facilitation of the US, the fronts agreed that the EPRDF would establish two 
months provisional government and would prepare an inclusive transitional conference 
that would lead to the organization of the transitional government of Ethiopia. Though the 
OLF participated in the conference willingly, the leadership later claimed that it was hard-
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pressed to participate in the transition process. It was assured by the United States that it 
would exert pressure on EPRDF to democratize the Ethiopian state (Markakis, 2011). 
Following the conference, the OLF and EPRDF prepared the draft transitional charter, 
which, it was claimed, was not radically different from what the EPRDF had prepared 
earlier (Vaughan, 1994). Ones the draft was finalized, the EPRDF discussed the document 
with organizations that were willing to participate in the conference. Discussion was 
undertaken with most organizations though those who represent the university claimed 
that they had no idea of even the existence of a charter (ibid.).  
The transitional conference was undertaken in July 1991 within which 27 organizations 
participated. Nineteen of these organizations were ethnic based political groupings, five 
were pan-Ethiopia, and three were from trade unions and the university. The conference 
debated the right to secession, and approved the right for self-determination with minimal 
reflection (Markakis, 2011). Those individuals who present serious objection on these 
issues were depicted to have objected to the core of the transition and hence threatened to 
be expelled from the transition process. The conference adopted a transitional charter and 
instituted a transitional government that would guide the transition process. In a stark 
break with the past and in line with the TPLF`s ideology, the charter emphasized the rights 
of nations and nationalities for self-determination including and up to secession. This was 
to be realized under a federal system structured along ethno-linguistic lines. The 
authoritarian and centralized political order was envisioned to be substituted by a 
decentralized, democratic ethnic federation.  
The transitional government constituted the council of representatives and the council of 
ministers. The former, which acts as the legislative organ of the government, had 87 
members out of which 32 was held by the EPRDF, 12 by the OLF, and the remaining divided 
among other groups that participated in the transitional conference. Likewise, the tope 
ministerial positions in the transitional government were given for EPRDF followed by the 
OLF. The council of representative established a constitutional commission mandated to 
prepare a draft constitution for the country. The commissions draft document was later 
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adopted by an elected body known as the constituent assembly. The constitution extended 
and further elaborated the basic provisions of the transitional charter.  
The extent the conference ushered in a genuine pact inclusive of all parties that opposed 
the military regime is contested. Some scholars and the government are of the view that the 
conference was fairly representative of various shades of opinion and organizations 
notwithstanding the dominance of ethnic based parties: there were some from the 
university, some organizations outside the country and many others within the country. 
The dominance of ethnic based parties was taken to be indicative of the seriousness of the 
national oppression of various groups. However, the mushrooming of nationality based 
parties could also be seen in terms of the incentive structure the EPRDF instituted in its 
recognition of national self-determination. Its agenda of dismantling the ideological and 
institutional basis of the Ethiopian state and its historical legacy of centralization reduced 
distrust among these forces. Hence, they enthusiastically engage in the common agenda of 
rebuilding a democratic Ethiopian state that grants the rights of nations, nationalities and 
peoples for self-determination including secession (Aklilu, 2006). De Waal (1992) also 
argued that the transition processes was broadly representative and that it was somehow 
democratic.  
The initial process of the transition and the charter underpinning the process is 
considered to have constituted a compact in some quarter. One of the leaders of the OLF 
claimed that “the charter is the first time Ethiopia has had a ‘compact for government’. In 
adopting it we were saying ‘although we differ we agree to abide by this sketchy document 
which shall govern the transition period.’ Instead of a constitution, which has always been 
a grant of a government, this was a basis for joining together and working together” (Lata 
quoted in Vaughan, 1994:59). In the subsequent period, EPRDF`s desire to control the 
transition in its favor led to a subtle manipulation of the pact building and democratizing 
aspects of the transition. The result is that ‘[w]hat had begun with a noisy diversity of 
views among a broad array of political organizations ended quietly with the clear 
hegemony of the EPRDF’ (Lyons 1995:121).  
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This assertion of an initially inclusive and democratic process ending with a one party 
dominance has to be seen in the context of each party’s interest and agenda in the process 
of transition. According to Aklilu (2006), the EPRDF and other ethno-nationalist forces had 
a common objective of deconstructing the centralized and authoritarian Ethiopian state. In 
addition to this, the EPRDF seek the contradictory goal of charting the transition process 
without diminishing its dominance and without encumbering the participation of other 
groups. To this end, the EPRDF encouraged the participation of political forces and elites 
that have the common strategic agenda of deconstructing the state. One of such actors was 
the OLF that sought to deconstruct what it called the colonial empire of Ethiopia through 
the principle of self-determination. The long term strategy of the OLF oscillates between 
securing an independent Oromia or a democratic transition where it would play a 
dominant role (Ottaway, 1995). Other smaller groups` desire to gain strategic advantage 
in the bargaining process drew them into the transition process. However, this apparently 
consensual process driven by the willing participation of ethnic forces soon began to 
dissipate.  In its bid to control political power unchallenged by opposition forces, the 
EPRDF subtly and steadily de-emphasized its democracy building agenda. A subtle process 
of recentralization and de-democratization soon set into motion. The constitutional base 
of division of power, the exclusionary governance practice, and the intimidation, 
harassment, and arrest of opposition members are all indicative of these trends. The result 
is that there has so far been no election that satisfied international standards (Lyons, 
2010). While the government continually limits the possibility for open competition, the 
opposition boycotted many of the elections with the goal of delegitimizing the 
government. The process resulted in the steady consolidation of the government and the 
persistent exclusion of the opposition. In the June 1992 election, the opposition boycotted 
the election alleging that their members are being harassed, intimidated and their office 
closed. The OLF, the major opposition party, faced stiff competition from the OPDO, 
EPRDF`s affiliate, that benefited from the support provided by the EPRDF. Alleging that the 
election would not be free and fair under the intimidating pre-election situation, the OLF 
withdrew from the transitional government and decamped its army. After brief fighting, 
the OLF was easily neutralized by the much sophisticated EPRDF force. At the core of the 
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contention was OLF `s objection against the operation of OPDO in Oromia and its political 
strategy. The OLF sought either independence or significant role in the post-1991 political 
order. To the dismay of the OLF, the EPRDF with the backing of a strong army also aims to 
control and dominate the subsequent process of socio-political restructuring. Hence, the 
OLF`s so far unsuccessful and gradually dissipating guerrilla warfare. 
Other scholars argued that the transitional process was exclusionary at the outset. The 
EPRDF selectively invited groups it deemed to have little political effects and deliberately 
excluded those established political parties that would challenge its hegemony on pretext 
that they were ‘warmongers and chauvinists’ (Kassahun, 2003). These parties include the 
Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party, the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (Meison in 
Amharic) and the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (Kasshun, 1994). It is also 
argued that the terms and provisions of the transitional charter were firmly controlled by 
the EPRDF with the fact that nothing that appears to be threatening its hold on power 
passes unexamined (Tuso, 1997). Moreover, the transitional charter was already prepared 
before the conference by the EPRDF and to a lesser extent by the OLF and that serious 
discussion on some issues was not held due to the fact that EPRDF discouraged such a 
move. Challenging the right to self-determination of the various nationalities was 
tantamount to challenging the core of the transition and hence parties were warned either 
to leave the conference or accept such a provisions (Vaughan, 1994). The constitution 
drafting process was systematically structured in such a way that opposition parties were 
forced to withdraw from the process or were made to do so by themselves. Thus, the 
transitional charter and the subsequent transitional process was not the result of ‘a 
genuine pact among all relevant entities’ (Mengisteab, 2007). 
What emerges from the discussion so far is that the transition process was dominated by 
ethnic based parties and ethno-nationalist forces. The ‘centrist’ constituency that wanted 
to maintain the unitary Ethiopian state intact, that opposed the secession of Eritrea and 
the subsequent landlockedness of the country, and that opposed the replacement of the 
army with ethnic based guerilla forces had been excluded from the transition process 
(Kassahun, 1995). The emphasis given for nations and nationalities in the transitional 
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charter and the sovereignty they are granted in the subsequent constitution signify the 
salience of ethnic issues. Not only the nations and nationalities of Ethiopia are vested with 
sovereign power but also they are granted the right to secede if they wish so. Those that 
do not yet have their own regional state are granted the right to form their own region. 
They are granted a full measure of self administration, cultural and historical preservation, 
and determination of their own language of administration.  
 The Causes of the Insurgency and the post-1991 Political Order  
The extent the post-1991 political arrangement addressed the causes of the insurgency is 
contested in the literature. As noted earlier, the major issues of contention were ethnic 
domination, political centralization and economic marginalization. The regime argues that 
it has addressed the national question by restructuring the Ethiopian state and granting 
sovereign power for the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. National groups 
have the unconditional right for self-determination that included a full measure of self-
administration, cultural protection, historical preservation, and the ultimate right for 
secession. The federal arrangement is structured along ethno-linguistic lines and that 
smaller ethnic groups are granted the right to self-administration in their respective 
locality; they have the right to establish their own regional state. Thus, the government 
argues that it has resolved the national question and is engaging in the process of 
economic development which is the pressing issues of the country. The regime also claims 
that it has instituted democratic system which, in the Ethiopian case, is essentially about 
addressing the rights of nations and nationalities. The government`s approach to state 
reconstitution is taken as a viable option in the absence of credible alternatives in some 
quarter (Young, 1996).  
There are two diverging views regarding the measures the regime undertook to address 
the national question. On the one hand, there are many who warned that the arrangement 
has gone too far and that it could lead to ethnic conflicts and disintegration of the state. 
These groups argue that the country is held together by the centralizing operational 
principle of the ruling party which otherwise will disintegrate under the force of ethno-
nationalism. This is mainly advocated by Amhara and Amharized elites that prioritized 
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their Ethiopian identity above and beyond their ethnic identity. On the other hand, others 
argue that while the autonomy granted to Ethnic groups is sufficient, it is not implemented 
unfailingly. Hence, they argued that the change of regime is not accompanied with change 
in the ethnocratic nature of the state. This position is held by elites that have been victims 
of historical marginalization and who aspire to get significant political leverage in the 
post-1991 political order. Whichever position holds true, ethnicity is still the dominant 
discourse in the country after twenty years of governance by revolutionary democrats 
which is presumed to be the result of the aspirations generated by the federal 
arrangement and its subsequent frustration due to the failure in its implementation 
(Hagmann and Abbibk, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2010).  
Studies that examined the practice of power decentralization argued that the arrangement 
does not bring the intended outcome of creating accountable, effective and autonomous 
regional and local governments that are able to match the available resources with the 
diverse needs (Paulos, 2007;  Abbink, 2009, 2011, Fissha, 2012, Markakis, 2011, Keller, 
2005 ). Though these authors seem to agree that decentralization has allowed a modicum 
of self-administration at the regional and local level, key decision making power is still 
centralized. According to Abbink (2011), the arrangement promoted ethnic self-
expression, uprooted old denigrating ethnic labeling, and enabled ethnic groups to control 
their respective bureaucracy and conduct day-to-day administration in their own 
language. However, the decision making process is still dominated by the elites at the 
center. Markakis (2011:282) captured this dynamics when he argued that ‘[t]he elite in 
the centre continue to rule; the elite in the periphery continue to administer.’  
Regarding the democratization process, there appears to be a consensus in the literature 
that governance in Ethiopia is characterized by authoritarian practices and exclusionary 
currents that exhibits no sign of abatement (Lyons, 1995, 2010; Ottaway, 1995; Aalan and 
Tronvoll, 2009; Abbink, 2011; Bach, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2009; Pausewang, 
2009; Hagmann and Abbink, 2011; Paulos, 2009; Tronvoll, 2009; Aklog, 2010). One strand 
of these literature argue about the ideological root of authoritarianism. The regime 
adheres to the ideology of revolutionary democracy that is reliant on building direct 
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coalition with the masses and hence does not need to institutionalize pluralism (Tronvoll 
and Vaughan, 2003). The ideology advocates a vanguard party that direct and preside over 
the political, economic and social transformation of the country, and emphasizes on self-
determination of ethnic groups under a tightly controlled space for civil society and the 
civil service (Hagmann and Abbink, 2011). The result is top-down decision making, 
marginalization of civil society, fusion of party, state and government, and entrenchment 
of structure of control and repression (Tronvoll, 2008; Abbink, 2009; ICG, 2010). A related 
literature argues that the EPRDF is using the ideology of revolutionary democracy as a 
discursive weapon to decimate internal challengers and external enemies (Batch, 2011). 
Another strand considers the irreconcilable nature of ethnic nationalism and multi-ethnic 
democracy (Solomon, 2009). In some quarter, the influence of authoritarian political 
culture, fragmentation of the opposition, and ethnicization of politics are identified to 
militate against democratizing the Ethiopian state (Kasshun, 2003; Asnake, 2011, Ottaway, 
1995). Finally, Ottaway (1995) take the argument further in asserting that the condition 
for democracy in Ethiopia does not exist. She argued that in the absence of countervailing 
forces against the EPRDF, the fragmentation of political parties to their ethnic component, 
and the weakness of civil society, democratization of the Ethiopian polity will be a remote 
possibility.  
The EPRDF started restructuring the Ethiopian economy in the backdrop of an utterly 
failed socialist policy. Though the EPRDF had been espousing Marxisim-Leninism before it 
overthrew the regime, the international circumstance following the fall of Soviet Union 
necessitated ideological reorientation and restructuring the economy along the capitalist 
lines. Accordingly, the EPRDF accepted the World Bank`s structural adjustment 
programme of economic liberalization and privatized state owned companies, reduced 
tariff, liberalized the exchange rate and devaluated the Birr. However, the economy has not 
been totally left for the market force; the state is still the most important actors in the 
economy. Banking and Insurance sectors, telecommunication, and electricity generation 
and distribution are dominated by the state. Generally, the economy has been dominated 
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by state owned enterprises, party owned endowments and party affiliated private sectors 
(Aklog, 2010). 
The government pursued a heterodox economic policy. The state acts as an agent of 
development by channeling resources to sectors and actors presumed to have high 
productivity. Until 2003, the policy yielded fluctuating growth rate which was not on par 
with the rate of population growth. Since then, the regime pursued a set of inter-related 
macro-economic policy measures that include maintaining low nominal interest rate, 
appreciating real exchange rate, and channeling banking system credit and foreign 
exchange to public enterprises, limiting recurrent public expenditure, and maintaining low 
external foreign exchange reserve. This strategy enabled the country to register a robust 
and broad based growth (WB, 2012, 2013; ADB, 2010; IMF, 2010). The government report 
indicated that poverty has dropped from 38.7% in 2004/2005 to 29.6% in 2010/2011 
enabling Ethiopia to halve poverty by 2015 (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, 2012). This reduction in poverty level is argued to be achieved in all regions 
of the country. The government`s pursuit of pro-poor policy by expanding infrastructure, 
boosting agriculture and food security programmes, increasing urban development effort, 
and facilitating private sector expansion is singled out as the main reason for this. There 
has been an increase in the amount of pro-poor spending from 57% in 2004/2005 to 67% 
in 2010/2011. However, this growth is not accompanied with structural transformation of 
the economy. The service sector accounts for more than half of the GDP followed by 
agriculture. The industrial sector contribution is stagnant throughout the period of growth 




Key Lessons and Emerging Propositions 
Key Lessons 
One of the perennial and often violent conversations about state building in Ethiopia has 
been centered on ethnicity dubbed as the ‘nationality issue’ or simply ‘the national 
question’. The fair representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in national politics and the 
deconstruction of ethnic hierarchy have been at the core of state building conversation 
throughout the second half of 20th century Ethiopia. To the dismay of many, it has also 
been one of the central issues determining the future trajectories of state building 
endeavors in the country. Superimposed over it, is the democratization of the state and 
decentralization of the decision making power. Both the imperial order and the military 
regime had a rigidly centralized state in which decision making power was concentrated in 
the hand of the emperor or Mengistu Hailemariam. Though these regimes used different 
legitimatizing ideologies and pursued different policy measures, the nature of the state 
was essentially the same. Centralization of power and arbitrary rule were the defining 
feature of the time. The overthrow of the military regime yet brought another paradigm of 
state building that aim to lay Ethiopian unity on the willing acceptance of its ethnic 
component. Notwithstanding some of the achievements related to linguistic and cultural 
rights, marginalized groups control over their regions, the decision making processes is 
still centralized. A number of continuities can be identified with the previous regimes in 
this regard. The state still is much reliant on the instrumentalities of control and 
repression and that the cry for deconstruction of ethnic hierarchy is still prevalent in some 
quarter. Hence, the prevailing modicum of peace and stability is the result of the regime`s 
entrenched and pervasive mechanism of control than the legitimacy it garners. The 
economic growth the regime has been recording since 2003/2004, which partly is the 
result of an inflow of donor’s money, underpinned these instruments of control and 
repression. The regime considers economic growth as the only way out from this 
unsustainable mode of governance that is much reliant on control and repression. It is 
hoped that sustained and broad based economic growth will increase the legitimacy of the 
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regime thereby laying ground for the liberalization of the political space and the 
democratization of state-society interactions.  
Thus, building sustainable state and peace in Ethiopia need to address three core issues 
without which a secure foundation for peace and durable state will not materialize. First, it 
essentially entails generating the consent of competing ethnonationalists to channel their 
national and political demand within the framework of the Ethiopian state. This might 
necessitate national reconciliation over historical injustices. Second, the first requirement 
necessitates the democratization of the state and the decentralization of decision making 
processes without which the possibility of resolving the first issue is foreclosed. Finally, 
the above two measures neither succeed nor results in a sustainable peace and state 
without a modicum of economic growth. Economic growth increases the infrastructural 
power of the state and reduces violent contestation over the spoils associated with 
controlling the state and hence eases the state building endeavor. 
Sustainable peace and durable state in Ethiopia are dependent on the extent these 
fundamental issues have been addressed. The trajectories so far indicate that there has 
been a steady consolidation and institutionalization of the apparatus of control. In 
comparison to the imperial order, the Derg was unmatched in its mobilization capacity 
and structure of control while it pales when compared with the current regime that 
commands even more pervasive and entrenched architecture of control and governance. 
However, this architecture of control and regulation has not been complemented with 
popular acceptance of the governance practices. Hence, while the Ethiopian state has been 
strong in its capacity for control, it has so far been weak in its capacity to command 
popular legitimacy. Its institutional strength and organizational effectiveness enabled it to 
preside over the process of economic transformation and to ensure political and social 
stability. However, the state`s reliance on control and at times repression rendered this 




Emerging propositions   
Based on the report provided so far the following key propositions are suggested for 
further investigation.   
1. Ethiopia’s central strengths, and also weaknesses, in peace and state building 
derive from its peculiar past. 
2. The conflicts in 20th century Ethiopia were caused by the exclusionary nature of 
the state. More specifically, they were about ethnic domination, political 
centralization and economic marginalization.   
3. The nature of the protracted war, the type of insurgency and organization 
determined the course of the political settlement and subsequent processes of state 
and peace building.      
4. The political settlement was not only exclusionary at the outset but also continues 
to be even more so in the subsequent period. 
5. The post-1991 political order partially addressed the major causes of conflict in the 
country and that this is followed by a modicum of peace and stability. 
6. The major issues of consideration in the settlement were ethnic and/or national 
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